I. INTRODUCTION
About the laudability of a general scheme of domestic adoption, few would disagree. Adoption provides a means of building families, hope for children in need, and a stabilizing influence for a society searching for aid in caring for its most helpless citizens. Still, one need not look far to find that the domestic adoption system in the United States is broken.
1
Evidence pointing toward such a conclusion abounds. About half a million children find themselves in the American foster care system on any given day, many with little chance of being either reunified with their birth families or placed in a permanent adoptive home.
2 Even outside the sphere of state-run care, this country's domestic adoption scheme fails many of the players involved. Adoptive parents, in particular, often become victims of the flawed scheme of private and agency adoption.
3 And though it may seem at first blush as though KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 adoptive parents are the members of the adoption triad 4 least deserving of sympathy, the result of a legal scheme that disfavors adoptive parents so substantially is quite troubling. In 2009 alone, nearly 13,000 children were adopted from countries outside the United States. 5 And while there is every reason to believe that wonderful families were created in these matches, the choice of so many American families to avoid domestic adoption is a significant one because it tends to negatively impact the fate of American children in need of adoption.
Even a glance at state law on infant adoption quickly illuminates the rationale of adoptive parents' decisions to adopt internationally. Planned domestic adoptions of newborns fail 6 at an alarming rate. 7 Perhaps more importantly, when such failures occur, adoptive parents find themselves out more than just emotion. Significant money is nearly always at stake as well. 8 In 1978, renowned law and economics scholar and future jurist Richard Posner published an article in which he described child adoption as a market activity-essentially a sale or trade "realized by a process of voluntary transacting. 4. See Zierdt, supra note 1, at 26 (describing adoptive parents, birth parents, and the children to be adopted as the three interested members of the adoption triad).
5. Total Adoptions to the United States, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: OFFICE OF CHILDREN'S ISSUES, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://adoption.state.gov/news/total_chart.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2010) .
6. As I intend the phrase here, the failure of a planned adoption includes both a decision by birth parents not to place the child with adoptive parents as previously planned and removal of the child from the adoptive home after placement but before the adoption is finalized.
7. See Dan Gearino, Money, Hope Lost in Failed Adoptions, QUAD-CITY TIMES (Feb. 21, 2006, 12:00 AM) , http://www.qctimes.com/news/local/article_4fd32e38-7947-5759-9d40-8c6f2948 e2cc.html (describing a survey conducted by Adoptive Families magazine that found that twentynine percent of readers polled had a failed domestic adoption); Susan Scherreik, Adoption: Now There's the Cyber-Stork, BUS. WK., Aug. 14, 2000, at 134E2, 134E4 (estimating a failure rate of between twenty-five and fifty percent). But see Alfred Kadushin & Frederick W. Seidl, Adoption Failure: A Social Work Postmortem, 16 SOC. WORK 32, 34 (1971) (arguing that the agency adoption failure rate is extremely low); Katharine Q. Seelye, Specialists Report Rise in Adoptions that Fail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1998 , at A14 (stating that domestic adoptions fail at a rate of 4.7 to 10 percent but the rates are increasing).
8. The total cost of a domestic adoption can be more than $40,000, depending on the circumstances and the state of adoption. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, COSTS OF ADOPTING 2 (2004) [hereinafter COSTS OF ADOPTING], available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/s_cost/ s_costs.pdf.
9. Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 324 (1978) .
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between supply and demand in the adoption context largely created by government prevention of the operation of a legal market for babies.
10
Posner opined that this model of adoption regulation has led to a black market for babies and suggested that an experimental move toward a free market in adoption may yield evidence on whether the experiment would solve the supply and demand mismatch plaguing the system.
11
Specifically, Posner suggested that adoption agencies take a fee surplus that could be generated by charging wealthy couples comparatively more for the agencies' services and using those profits to pay pregnant women considering terminating their pregnancies through abortion to incentivize them to instead carry the baby to term and relinquish it for adoption.
12
The value of the experiment, Posner suggested, would be the creation of data that could help to remedy the supply and demand disparity, including figures on what adoptive parents would be willing to pay for a child and just how much money pregnant women would require to carry a baby to term and subsequently execute a surrender of parental rights. 13 Posner's article was exceptionally controversial, 14 so much so that pundits speculated it may be one of the most significant reasons he could never be successfully nominated to serve as a justice of the United States Supreme Court. 15 Posner himself felt compelled to defend the article twenty-five years later, noting that he never "advocated 'baby selling,'" but rather argued that state law in the 1970s, which capped the sums that could be paid in connection with child adoption at a nominal amount, might be modified experimentally to determine whether it would increase the baby supply. 16 Thirty years later, Posner has come startlingly close to getting his wish. Baby selling is still uniformly illegal in the United States, 17 but our KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 system of domestic infant adoption is an exceptionally expensive transaction which comes rather close.
18
A domestic adoption can frequently cost roughly $40,000, a substantial sum even when one considers the fees of the agents and lawyers involved. 19 One of the most significant of the expenses surrounding the domestic adoption of a newborn comes not from any of these professional fees, 20 however, but rather from the payment of living expenses to the expectant mother. 21 Adoptive parents typically front these monies under the sanction of state law authorizing such expenditures. 22 This scheme, under which substantial living expenses are paid to a prospective birth mother, 23 who makes the ultimate choice to parent her child the vast majority of the time, 24 is fraught with problems. Comparisons between baby selling and a scheme allowing for the payment of substantial sums for housing or other expenses of daily life § 127.287 (1) (West 2008) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:13(II) (Supp. 2009) ; N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2010 Children?, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 429, 473 (2004) (arguing that preconception agreements also constitute baby selling and are void and unenforceable).
18. See Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59, 71 (1987) (arguing that the legal scheme allowing the payment of substantial sums to birth mothers is really a sale in disguise). But see Zierdt, supra note 1, at 44 (stating that compensating birth mothers is not baby selling).
19. COSTS OF ADOPTING, supra note 8, at 2. Some complicated domestic adoptions cost upwards of $100,000. See Laura Mansnerus, Market Puts Price Tags on the Priceless, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1998, at A1. 20 . Legal expenses in an adoption may include attorneys' fees for the birth parents, adoptive parents, a guardian for the child, and an adoption agency. 1 JACOBS, supra note 3, § 4:26.
21. See Melinda Lucas, Essay, Adoption: Distinguishing Between Gray Market and Black Market Activities, 34 FAM. L.Q. 553, 556 (2000) . See generally Gearino, supra note 7 (adoptive mother estimates that she and her husband spent about $25,000 on the adoption, which included several months of living expenses); Ryan Mills, Woman Fakes Pregnancy in Adoption Scam, SCRIPPSNEWS (Aug. 1, 2008) , http://www.scrippsnews.com/node/35187/12187 (adoptive father said he and his wife "paid close to $4,000 . . . in living expenses"). § 76-7-203 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010 .
23. Some have argued against the use of terms such as "birth family," "birth parent," and "birth mother," arguing that they are imbued with negative connotations. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 358-66 (1991) . Nonetheless, I use these terms to describe the biological parents of the adopted child as the phrases are still the most well-recognized and accepted labels for these groups.
24. It is estimated that as many as eighty percent of pregnant women who work with adoption agencies and attorneys to select a placement for their unborn child decide to parent the child instead of going through with the adoptive placement. Mansnerus, supra note 19, at A17.
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REREGULATING THE BABY MARKET 289 are almost inescapable. 25 Questions about the voluntariness of a birth mother's surrender arise in connection with the payment of living expenses and are weightier than the concerns surrounding other types of adoption-related expenses. 26 Moreover, birth mothers often actually profit from the payment of their living expenses, necessarily raising the same concerns which have been used to justify a ban on baby selling.
27
Perhaps worst is that because not all birth mothers are similarly valued, allowing prospective adoptive parents to pay birth-mother living expenses serves to injure society as a whole by striating race and class divisions.
Part II of this Article describes the varying approaches states have taken for regulation of housing payments and similar expenses in connection with child adoption. This Part explores state laws allowing virtually unfettered payment of actual living expenses and state bans on all such payments, along with solutions on the continuum between these two. Part III details the harms of existing state rules sanctioning the payment of birth-mother living expenses by prospective adoptive parents, including a discussion of the slippery slope that separates the payment of expenses from baby selling, the potential for serious questions regarding the voluntariness of the birth mother's surrender of 25. "Baby selling" is generally statutorily defined as the giving or receiving of anything of value in exchange for the consent to or placement of a child for adoption. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West 2008) ("It is a misdemeanor for any person or agency to pay, offer to pay, or to receive money or anything of value for the placement for adoption or for the consent to an adoption of a child."). Certainly, housing payments would be construed as a "thing of value." 26. § 48-22-803(e) .
42. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(C) (prohibiting compensation for consenting to place a child for adoption), and IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9(a) (establishing the transfer of property for consent to adoption as a Class D felony), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-114(A) (allowing a court to approve any reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in connection with the adoption, including costs for medical and hospital care and examinations for the mother and child, counseling fees, legal fees, agency fees, living expenses, and any other costs the court finds reasonable and necessary), and IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9(b) (allowing payment for attorney's fees, hospital and medical, agency fees, birth parent counseling, costs of housing, utilities, phone service, or any additional itemized necessary living expense for birth mother during the second or third trimester of pregnancy and not more than six weeks after birth, maternity clothing, travel expenses that relate to the pregnancy or adoption, and actual wages lost).
43 One possible payment stands out from these others, however, as more controversial and worthy of additional scrutiny-namely, the payment of birth-parent living expenses during the period of pregnancy and perhaps even for some period after the birth of the child. The vast majority of states allows prospective adoptive parents and the agencies and lawyers with whom they work to facilitate adoptions-to pay rent, utilities, or other housing-related expenses of birth parents. 45 Indeed, only five states forbid-either legislatively or judicially-all such payments. 46 Still, state law varies rather significantly when it comes to precisely what living expenses adoptive parents can permissibly cover without crossing the line into an illegal child sale. Models of state regulation vary from allowing such payments without restriction to a complete ban, but laws tend to center around more moderate schemes, including sanctioning only the payment of "reasonable" living expenses, capping these expenses at a specific dollar amount or providing (1) (allowing reasonable living expenses for no more than 120 days prior to birth mother's expected date of delivery and for no more than sixty days after birth of child); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9(b)(5) (allowing reasonable living expenses during second or third trimester of pregnancy and not more than six weeks after childbirth, not to exceed $1000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9(2)(d) (allowing living expenses for no longer than thirty days after birth); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2121(a)(6) (allowing reasonable living expenses if incurred during or as a result of the pregnancy); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1200(B)(7) (allowing living expenses for a reasonable time before birth and for no more than forty-five days after birth); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-306(a) (allowing living expenses for biological mother and child); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(3)(d) (allowing living expenses for birth mother before birth and for no more than six weeks after birth); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55(4) (allowing reasonable living expenses if needed to maintain an adequate standard of living that birth mother is unable to otherwise maintain); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-117(4) (allowing mother's reasonable living expenses); MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.075(1) (allowing living expenses if within the norms of the community in which the birth mother resides); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-7-101(1)(h) (allowing temporary living costs for birth mother); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(3) (allowing necessary living expenses related to birth of the child); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:13(1)(d) (allowing living expenses if necessary to maintain an adequate standard of living that birth mother is otherwise unable to maintain); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.1(e) (allowing living expenses of birth mother during period of pregnancy and for period not to exceed four weeks after termination of pregnancy); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(B) (allowing living expenses of birth mother and dependent children for a reasonable time before birth or placement of the adoptee and for no more than six weeks after birth or placement of the adoptee); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (allowing reasonable and actual expenses for housing for a reasonable time not to exceed sixty days before birth and later of thirty days after birth or thirty days after parental consent to adoption); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-103(a)(4) (allowing ordinary living expenses of birth mother during pregnancy and for no more than six weeks after birth); N.D. CENT. (1)(e) (allowing living expenses if needed to maintain an adequate standard of living that birth mother is unable to otherwise maintain); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(C) (allowing living expenses of birth mother not to exceed $3000 incurred during pregnancy through the sixtieth day after minor's birth); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-3.2 (allowing reasonable living expenses if incurred during adoption planning process or during pregnancy not to exceed two months after birth of minor or after consent of birth mother); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2533(d) (allowing living expenses of birth mother for reasonable time before birth and for no more than six weeks after birth); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 63-9-310(F)(1) (allowing reasonable living expenses for a reasonable period of time); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-109(B)(i) (allowing reasonable and actual expenses for housing for a reasonable period not to exceed ninety days prior to or forty-five days after birth or surrender or parental consent to adoption); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (1)(a)(iii)(B)(II) (allowing temporary living expenses during pregnancy or confinement); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 7-103(a)(9) (allowing living expenses of mother for reasonable time before birth and for no more than six weeks after birth); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1218 (allowing reasonable and necessary expenses for shelter when birth mother unable to support herself); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.913(1)(i) (allowing living expenses of birth mother, not to exceed $5000, only to protect welfare of birth mother or fetus). KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
A. The Gold Card: Expenses Without Limitation
In view of general state prohibitions on baby selling, no state statute sanctions the payment of birth-parent living expenses while expressly describing those permissible expenses as unlimited. Rather, states sanctioning adoptive-parent payment of birth-parent living expenses often describe permissible payments in very general terms, such as those "related to the placement of the child."
48 Even when living expenses are expressly mentioned by statute, the trend is to simply say that adoptive parents may pay such expenses to birth parents without running afoul of state law criminalizing sales of a human being. 49 Still, jurisprudence in a number of states indicates that courts are often willing to allow substantial-even unfettered-expenditures for living, so long as the birth family actually incurred the expenses.
50

B. "Reasonableness" and "Necessity" Limitations
Far more common than statutes without any express boundaries for the payment of living expenses are laws that specifically sanction prospective adoptive parents' payment of birth-parent living expenses only when such expenses are "reasonable" or "necessary." At least twenty-one states have adopted such a rule.
51 State law varies widely on 
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the issue of what is reasonable and necessary, and some states provide no statutory guidance on the meaning of the terms in this context. Moreover, the timing of the reasonableness determination has a significant impact on the effectiveness of the rule in weeding out baby sales. Ironically, most states adopting a reasonableness or necessity test to review the propriety of expense payments select the time at which rational decisions about expense propriety are least likely to be madenamely, at finalization hearings.
52
Other states provide for a determination of reasonableness or necessity at some earlier time. Arizona gives what is perhaps the best guidance on the substantive limitations of reasonableness or necessity rules. That state's laws specifically provide that, in assessing living-expense payments, courts are to consider "the current standard of living of the birth parent," "[t]he standard of living necessary to preserve the health and welfare of the birth parent and the unborn child," and "the existence of alternative financial resources for the birth parent." 54 New Hampshire and Minnesota address similar issues but describe permissible living-expense payments in terms of loss of the birth parent's ability to maintain full employment for some period of the pregnancy.
55
Both states' statutes define necessary expenses as those required to maintain the birth mother in the standard of living to which she is § 43-15-117 (4) easonable living expenses of the birth mother which are necessary to maintain an adequate standard of living, which the birth mother is unable to otherwise maintain because of loss of income or other support resulting from the pregnancy and lost wages resulting from the pregnancy or delivery"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55 (allowing birth parent to receive "reasonable living expenses of the birth mother which are needed to maintain an adequate standard of living which the birth mother is unable to otherwise maintain because of loss of income or other support relating from the pregnancy"). KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 accustomed but is unable to maintain because of loss of income or other support resulting from her pregnancy.
56
The reasonableness and necessity inquiry in these states, then, is strongly tied to lost wages. Living expenses are essentially intended as a substitute for the lost wages, which come about as a result of the birth mother's decision to carry the baby to term. 57 2. Procedural Hindrances: When Are Reasonableness and Necessity Determined?
Setting aside state law variations on the meaning of reasonable or necessary in the living expenses context, states still substantially diverge when applying these rules as a result of procedural considerations. Essentially, the question concerns the timing of a reasonableness or necessity finding.
If the purpose of imposing a limitation on permissible living-expense payments is to shield adoptions from perceived impropriety-essentially to persuasively rebuff serious charges of baby selling while still fostering the practice of adoption-then one might expect the determination of reasonableness or necessity to be made early on. Ideally, all parties involved in the triad, most particularly the potential adoptive parents, need to know what monies can permissibly change hands before any payments are made. Indeed, one New York court advised attorneys involved in child adoptions to obtain court approval before making expenditures related to birth mothers' pregnancies.
58 Unfortunately, such a solution is impracticable. Courts generally are not permitted to issue advisory opinions, 59 and at the stage when a prospective adoptive parent would need approval of living expenses yet to be paid, there would not yet be a court proceeding.
60 A judicial proceeding related to an adoption is initiated only by petition 61 after the birth and consent of the birth parents to the adoption. 62 The importance of this procedural posture for determining whether living expenses are reasonable is significant because it serves to undermine the effectiveness of the reasonableness rule in preserving the integrity of adoptions as a financially neutral transaction. 64 The rules on advisory opinions, which prohibit judges from granting advance authorization for adoption-related payments, essentially place the question of propriety before the judge for the first time at the finalization hearing. In most cases, the child has already lived with the potential adoptive parents for a period of six months or a year by this time. 65 Judges' options are limited in such scenarios. Refusing to grant the petition to finalize the adoption would be almost unconscionable, 66 yet state law limiting a court's ability to order a birth parent to reimburse excessive fees may provide a judge no other "sanction" for the payment of living expenses that are not reasonable or necessary. 67 The trend, 13, 2003) , http://www.acal.org/birth.htm (explaining that payments from adoptive parents to birth parents make adoption a financially neutral option for the birth mother rather than a moneymaking opportunity). § 9-9-213 (West 2009) then, is that the inquiry conducted at this stage is not truly a serious one, 68 which undermines the structure of the rule itself as a means of ensuring that adoption does not become baby selling.
C. Specific Monetary Caps
Three states attempt to curb blurring of the lines between allowing payments of birth-parent living expenses and baby selling by imposing specific dollar limitations on living-expense payments that adoptive parents are permitted to make. 69 For instance, Connecticut allows total birth-parent living expenses of no more than $1500 in connection with the placement of a child. 70 Wisconsin caps living expenses at a more generous $5000 but requires that such payments be "necessary to protect the health and welfare of the birth mother or the fetus. Perhaps the most instructive body of state law on imposing particular caps as a means of controlling the payment of birth-parent living expenses in connection with adoptive placements is that in Ohio. Before late 2008, Ohio was one of just a handful of states altogether disallowing the payment of birth-parent living expenses in connection with the adoption of a child.
72
Before 2008, Ohio law allowed prospective adoptive parents to pay medical expenses incurred around the time of the child's birth and legal expenses associated with the surrender and placement of the child, but all other payments to birth parents were prohibited as a violation of Ohio's baby-selling statute, which prohibits "any disbursements in connection with [a] minor's permanent surrender, placement, or adoption."
73
In December 2008, however, the Ohio legislature lifted its ban on the payment of living expenses to allow prospective adoptive parents, through agencies or attorneys only, to pay birth-mother living expenses not to exceed the sum of $3000.
74 Some Ohio adoption lawyers contended that the change was a positive one for Ohio, as couples were "losing babies" when birth mothers traveled out of the state to give birth to and place their children in states that did allow some expenditures for housing. 75 Ohio's new law aligned it with that of Connecticut and Wisconsin, then, in attempting to strike a balance on the living-expense issue. Indeed, advocates of the new Ohio law specifically described it as a means of "help[ing] birth mothers and still maintain [ing] enough court oversight to prevent adoptions from becoming sales."
76
D. Limitation to the "Period of Confinement"
A number of states limit the payment of birth-parent living expenses, not with a reasonableness requirement or a cap on permissible expenditures but, rather, by limiting the period of time for which such expenses may be covered by potential adoptive parents. The idea behind these limitations based on an expense's proximity to the birth may not be immediately obvious. A glance at legislative history in the aforementioned states, however, indicates that states choosing this manner of regulating living-expense payments to birth mothers are trying to maintain the economic neutrality of the adoption transaction for birth mothers whose employment abilities may be diminished for a portion of the pregnancy.
82
In keeping with this goal, at least one scholar has articulated that rules setting forth short windows for the payment of birth-parent living expenses should closely track the "period of confinement" associated with pregnancy.
83
Whether that is done by setting out a period of days or by designating that expenses may be paid only for a reasonable time, the purpose of the rule is to serve as a sort of substitute for wages or other sources of income the birth mother may not receive because of the confinement associated with the pregnancy. PRACTICE § 5.09 (1997) . 84. See Donnelly, supra note 56, § 6:20 (stating that adoptive parents may not reimburse the birth mother for lost income because "[m]ost birth mothers spend roughly the same amount as they earn on living expenses," but "payment by adopting parents for expenses has the same practical effect as reimbursement of [the birth mother's] lost income").
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REREGULATING THE BABY MARKET 303 the extent a birth mother is unable to work during the final period of her pregnancy, the states allowing these expenses during a short window essentially allow her to maintain housing even without a traditional source of income. Virginia has taken very seriously the notion of living expenses as a substitute for wages that can no longer be earned due to the demands of pregnancy.
85 But instead of relying on a sixty-or ninety-day period before the birth of the child to appropriately limit these expenses, the Virginia legislature has expressly allowed adoptive parents to pay reasonable and necessary expenses for shelter, food, clothing, and the like only on proof of the "written advice of [a] physician, [that] the birth mother is unable to work or otherwise support herself due to medical reasons or complications associated with the pregnancy or birth of the child." 86 Because not all pregnancies leave birth mothers unable to work for any significant period, 87 the Virginia rule is more tailored to addressing the concerns that led states to limit living-expense payments temporally in the first place.
New Hampshire and Minnesota are somewhat similar. Both states' statutes expressly provide for the payment of only necessary living expenses and do not delineate any particular window for the permissibility of these payments before the birth. 88 At first glance, then, it would seem these two states should be categorized as those limiting the payment of living expenses by a determination of reasonableness or necessity rather than those employing a short window of time to impose a limitation. In reality, however, these two states are best described as a hybrid of the two models. Both states allow only the payment of necessary expenses, but necessity in those statutes is defined in terms of maintaining a standard of living for the birth mother that is adequate when she is unable to maintain such a standard herself because of lost wages or income. 89 Of course, it is likely in states regulating solely with a time-period limitation that the same expenses would be covered under each formulation of the rule. After all, the demands of pregnancy for the 85 vast majority of women typically only render a woman unable to be employed toward the tail end of the pregnancy. 90 Both articulations of the rule, then, strive to rebuff charges of baby selling by limiting the permissibility of such payments to the "period of confinement." State statutes focusing on lost income rather than a specific number of days before birth are just more likely to match the period of confinement precisely.
E. Outright Bans
Finally, a very small number of states prohibit prospective adoptive parents from paying the housing costs of the birth mothers altogether. With Ohio defecting in 2008 to a cap system, 91 today only five states disallow the payment of living expenses entirely.
92
Texas law provides an instructive example of such a ban. A criminal statute in Texas defines the offense of "[s]ale or purchase of [a] child" as offering to accept, agreeing to accept, or accepting "a thing of value for the delivery of the child to another or for the possession of the child by another for purposes of adoption."
93
The statute goes on to list exceptions to "thing[s] of value," including agency fees, medical expenses, legal expenses, and even "necessary" pregnancy-related expenses-which may be read to include living expenses-but only if such expenses are "paid by a child-placing agency." 94 Thus, birthmother living expenses may be paid in Texas agency adoptions, though not in private adoptions. There is no exception to the Texas baby-selling statute which would permit the payment of living expenses directly from a prospective adoptive parent to a birth parent, even using an attorney as an intermediary.
In DeJesus v. State, the defendant birth mother was convicted of violating the Texas Penal Code for selling her child to her attorney, Thacker, the defendant in a sister case. 95 The evidence showed that Thacker paid DeJesus $12,000 for a relinquishment of parental rights for five of her children aged newborn to four years old. 96 DeJesus asked for a jury instruction that she should be found not guilty if the jury found that she received the money as a reimbursement for living expenses, including housing, food, and clothing, but the trial court denied the jury instruction. 97 The appellate court held that the trial court properly denied the instruction, as the payment of living expenses is not an express statutory exception to the ban on "baby selling." 98 The Texas appellate court upheld the defendant's conviction. 99 In Pennsylvania, adoptive parents sought reimbursement of "unusual" fees paid to their intermediary agency after completion of an adoption.
100 Those fees included $50 per week in birth-mother housing expenses, paid not for the housing of the woman whose child they planned to adopt-that would clearly violate Pennsylvania's baby-selling statute-but rather for another pregnant woman planning to relinquish her child for adoption through the same agency. 101 The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's order requiring the agency to reimburse the adoptive parents for these housing expenses, calling the arrangement an "attempted subterfuge" that would permit a birth parent to profit impermissibly from an adoption.
III. THE FAILURE OF EXISTING SOLUTIONS TO THE LIVING-EXPENSES PROBLEM
The nearly overwhelming predilection of states to allow prospective adoptive parents to pay some birth-mother living expenses is disturbing when one begins to seriously analyze both the impression these rules create and their real-world pragmatic effects. The rules regarding birthmother living expenses help none of the players involved in domestic adoption. Payments for housing and other related expenses send the exceptional payments were limited to agency, legal, and medical fees. wrong message about adoption, fostering an all-too-easy analogy to baby selling and possibly even causing long-term damage to society in the form of exacerbating existing class and race divisions. Birth parents, ironically, may also suffer from receipt of these payments, as they tend to interfere with the voluntariness of surrenders. The impact on prospective adoptive parents of the allowance of such payments is demonstrably significant and negative. And because living-expense rules make prospective adoptive parents less likely to pursue domestic adoption, they harm children as well.
A. The Thin Line Between Child Sales and Housing Payments
One significant problem with a scheme of rules that generally allows the payment of birth-mother living expenses is that the payment of these sums tends to obfuscate the already thin line between mere assistance and baby selling.
103 Unlike other adoption-related expenses, allowing prospective adoptive parents to pay birth-mother living expenses actually allows the birth mother to profit from the adoption transaction. And while such profit may seem acceptable when the child is successfully placed and all members of the triad are pleased with the outcome, serious societal harms result, most particularly along lines of race and class.
Living Expenses as Gray-Market Activities
To prohibit child trafficking, state statutes generally speak in terms of prohibiting persons from giving or receiving "money or other consideration or thing[s] of value" 104 in connection with the adoption of a child. 105 Medical expenses, legal expenses, and even living expenses incurred during the period of pregnancy and for a short time after the adoption are clearly covered, and thus prohibited, under the plain language of state baby-selling statutes. But these expenses are generally 
2011]
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106
The gist of this view is that a birth mother should not be placed in a better position by a match with a prospective adoptive family. 107 At the same time, concerns about whether a birth mother would choose adoption were she to emerge from a pregnancy and adoptive placement worse off financially-particularly given the legal availability of abortion as an alternative 108 -have led state legislators to err on the side of striving for economic neutrality.
109
A further justification often espoused for allowing prospective adoptive parents to cover some birth-parent living expenses during the period leading up to the birth and adoption is that prospective adoptive parents have a strong interest in adopting a healthy child.
110 Ensuring that the birth mother is well cared for is the best way to promote the birth of a healthy baby.
111 When it comes to medical expenses, for instance, this line of thinking is rather easily supported. A birth mother who receives adequate prenatal care and competent medical assistance during the birth of the child is more likely to deliver a healthy newborn.
112
Viewed through this lens, the payment of some pregnancy-related expenses by adoptive parents serves only to promote the health and safety of the birth mother, and by extension, the baby she carries. Payments made solely to safeguard health and promote the welfare of the birth mother and child do not often raise red flags. Most would not argue that a prospective adoptive parent's payment of the birth mother's $5000 hospital bill for the child's delivery would even come close to baby REV. 133, 138 (1992) (stating that the medical-expense exception "is permitted because it is deemed to directly benefit the child's best interests"). KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 selling. 113 Expenses related to health and safety simply are not often negatively perceived-likely because of adherence to the goal of financial neutrality for the birth mother in the adoption transaction.
These legislative goals of economic neutrality and narrowing permissible adoption-related expenses to those that affect the health or safety of the birth mother are nicely achieved when one considers medical, and even legal, expenses incurred in connection with adoption. These expenses can be definitively and demonstrably tied to the pregnancy, birth, and placement of the child.
114 They are direct expenses connected solely with the birth and adoption. Hospital fees associated with the child's birth, for instance, would not be incurred absent the birth mother's pregnancy and her decision to carry the baby to term. Legal fees associated with the placement of the child and finalization of the adoption would not be incurred absent the birth mother's implementation of her adoption plan. These are truly expenditures which would not be made but for the continued pregnancy, birth, and subsequent adoption. Allowing prospective adoptive parents to cover these expenses, then, ensures that the birth mother neither profits nor suffers economically as a result of the choices she makes.
115
With living expenses, however, the same rationale is unpersuasive. Those advocating the permissibility of living-expense payments in connection with domestic adoption uniformly proffer the justification of creating financial neutrality for the birth mother in the adoptive placement.
116
But such arguments consistently ignore the fact that prospective adoptive parents' payment of the birth mother's housing expenses almost certainly provides an advantage that the birth mother would not have absent the pregnancy. Unlike medical expenses relating to birth or legal expenses relating to the execution of a surrender, living expenses-particularly housing costs-are not expenses with any causal connection either to pregnancy or to adoptive placement. Whether they are pregnant or not, whether they have created an adoption plan or not, and regardless of personal circumstances, all persons endure the hardship of either paying for adequate housing or relying on the charity of friends or social-welfare programs.
Pregnancy does not transform that responsibility because the responsibility is not one related to the birth or adoption plan of the birth mother, except perhaps during a short and 113. See Barwin, 307 P.2d at 184 (reasoning that there is nothing "inimical to public policy" in allowing adoptive parents to pay the medical expenses of the birth mother).
114. 
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rarely occurring 117 window during which a birth mother's pregnancyrelated health complications preclude her from working to earn income necessary to pay for housing. 118 For the vast majority of pregnancies, the ability of a birth mother to charge prospective adoptive parents for the costs of living she would have otherwise had to bear herself makes for an anything-but-neutral transaction. Particularly in states without any dollar cap or time limit imposed on living expenses, prospective birth parents stand to reap relatively substantial financial gain through the deflection of financial responsibility for their housing needs. 119 The gain may not come in the form of a cash infusion directly to the birth mother, but the financial gain is no less substantial when it is achieved through the birth mother's indirect enjoyment of cost-free living, often limited only by a requirement that prospective adoptive parents cover only living expenses actually incurred. 120 With the rationale of fiscal neutrality gone, it is difficult to draw any meaningful line between the conduct of providing a housing benefit to a birth mother and simply giving her a cash payment of the same amount to use in any manner she wishes.
Moreover, the desire to protect the health and safety of the birth mother, and thereby her unborn child, is an equally weak argument in favor of allowing such a clear economic boon to birth mothers. Living expenses simply are not like medical expenses insofar as they cannot so clearly be cabined as impacting the health of the child to be adopted.
121
Those who would permit the payment of living expenses argue that "the public policy behind permitting [living] expenses is the assumption that a pregnant mother who is housed and fed will give birth to a healthier baby than a mother who is not."
122 This assumes that the only possibilities are homelessness or a home provided by prospective adoptive parents and, likewise, starvation or food provided by prospective adoptive parents. Reality is likely to provide a much less stark contrast between alternatives. And given that reality, a problem of line-drawing becomes obvious rather quickly. A whole panoply of needs may be viewed-117. See Being Pregnant at Work, supra note 87 (noting that if the birth mother is a healthy woman with a typical pregnancy working in a safe environment, she may be able to continue working until the day of delivery or close to it).
118. albeit with a liberal lens-to affect the health and welfare of the birth mother and therefore the fetus she carries. Clothing, for instance, has been likened to shelter insofar as both may be viewed as impacting the health and welfare of the birth mother.
123
Are we then to sanction provision by adoptive parents of a halcyon environment and delectable foods for expectant mothers on the grounds these are beneficial to the child? If medical science were to determine that stress during pregnancy was inimical to the fetus, and an expectant mother's employment were causing her stress, would prospective adoptors be expected to employ an agency to find the mother a happier work environment, or perhaps simply support the mother during her pregnancy lest the added stress inhibit the baby's development or effect his insufferable disposition?
124
The slippery slope from living expenses down to outright baby selling is indeed a steep one, and when such expenses are allowed based on a thin health or welfare justification, it is difficult to imagine why similar arguments could not be made just as persuasively for a host of disturbing expenses-a large, safe vehicle, 125 an exercise club membership, and frequent massages. 126 In short, allowing the payment of living expenses when they are neither but-for expenses of the pregnancy nor expenses that can seriously be said to affect the welfare of the child for whom adoption is considered makes the adoption a veiled transaction which comes alarmingly close to a child sale.
The Harm of the Victimless Crime
Philosophically, a lot of people feel that the violation of adoption laws [in the form of impermissible payments to the birth mother, for instance] is a victimless crime. The status of the child is improved. 123. In re Adoption No. 9979, 591 A.2d at 468 (noting that lack of clothing could have an adverse effect on the health and welfare of the natural mother and unborn child as well); id. at 481 (Eldridge, J., concurring) (arguing that the legislative history of the prohibition shows that the statute should not be construed to ban a small payment for maternity clothes).
124. In re Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d 925, 929 (Pa. 1986). 125. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Alyssa, L.B., 501 N.Y.S.2d 595, 596 (Sur. Ct. 1986) (considering adoptive parents' payment for the purchase of an automobile for birth mother).
126. The Academy of California Adoption Lawyers defined pregnancy-related living expenses to include maternity clothing, housing that is consistent with the birth mother's usual lifestyle, groceries, and transportation payment assistance. See FAQ's About Birth Mother Expenses, supra note 64.
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The adoptive parents are getting what they want, and typically, the mother who wants to place the child places the child."
127
Even if state law creates a situation in which prospective adoptive parents frequently straddle the thin line between merely covering a birth mother's housing expenses and buying a baby, many would ask, Who cares? What, precisely, is the harm? Margaret Jane Radin, in her well-known piece Market-Inalienability, persuasively catalogues the potential harm to society as a whole flowing from commodification of infants. 128 Radin describes a number of harms, all injurious to the very notion of personhood itself. One such harm is that commodifying infants means placing a dollar value on them, and these value determinations will be made in a manner "injurious to their personhood and to the personhood of those who buy and sell on this basis, exacerbating class, race, and gender divisions."
129 Transported to the living-expenses context, this theory seems to hold quite strongly. There is already no doubt that birth mothers who will give birth to white infants are more highly sought after in the domestic-adoption arena than are pregnant women who will deliver African-American or mixed-race babies.
130
This reality is likely to persist simply because more prospective adoptive families wish to raise white infants, likely owing to the fact that the vast majority of prospective adoptive parents are themselves white.
131 Probably little can be done-at least until society REV. 713, 716 (1999) ("[A] s only a quarter of the children waiting for adoption are labeled white, it is almost impossible for white parents to adopt [a white infant] domestically without extensive waiting periods."); see also Adoption House, Inc. v. P.M., No. 02-12-07TN, 00-37796, 2003 WL 23354141, at *4 (Del. Fam. Ct. Oct. 9, 2003 (noting that the prospective adoptive family decided against adoption at the hospital during the child's birth after learning the child was biracial).
131. See Amanda Spake, Adoption Gridlock, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 22, 1998, at 30 (explaining that more Caucasian parents are interested in adoption than minority parents); William Tyree, The Business of International Adoption, JAPAN TIMES, June 9, 1999, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fv19990609a2.html (explaining that the fact that Caucasian parents seek to adopt more than minority parents has led to competition in the United States for Caucasian infants and approximately eighty percent of those seeking to adopt from Russia do so because of their desire for a child from the same race). KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 moves further toward a racially neutral view of the family-to modify that demand. But allowing prospective adoptive parents to pay birth-mother living expenses simply further striates existing racial divisions. Because a birth mother's receipt of living expenses is not a financially neutral transaction, 132 white birth mothers are likely to be well-supported and even to financially benefit from cost-free housing during pregnancythereby improving their economic positions-while birth mothers in the racial minority are likely to continue unsupported. The message that white infants and white birth mothers are "worth more" is precisely the type of perceptual injury to personhood that Professor Radin describes in the context of baby selling. 133 The risk of the damage caused by the transaction is strong enough to break the link between the payment of living expenses and baby selling entirely by prohibiting the payment of housing and other related expenses of the birth mother in connection with adoption.
B. The Infringement on Voluntariness
Even aside from its tie to baby selling, society should be concerned about the payment of birth-mother living expenses because of the serious questions state laws on this issue raise with regard to the voluntariness of birth-mother consent, and thus, the integrity of the entire adoptive placement.
134 Just how free is the surrender of a child for adoption given by an emotionally fragile and exceptionally poor woman 135 who sees the possibility of economic reward as a way out of her situation? Prohibitions on baby selling were adopted "to deter the potentially coercive effect of payments to expectant mothers at a time when the best 132. See supra Part III.A.1. 133. See Radin, supra note 128, at 1932 (arguing that women's attributes, such as height, eye color, race, intelligence, and athletic ability, will be monetized, and surrogates with "better" qualities will command higher prices as a result); see also Ever, TIME, Oct. 9, 1989, at 86 ("[A] doptive parents won't blink an eyelash over paying $20,000 to $30,000 for a healthy white baby.").
134. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 13 (statement of Pamela Zekman, Investigative Reporter, Chi. Sun-Times) (reporting that girls involved with certain baby brokers who received various forms of compensation were pressured not to change their minds about relinquishing consent because they would have to pay thousands of dollars in reimbursement).
135. See Lisa Kelly, West Virginia's Adoption Statute: The History of a Work in Progress, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1999) (claiming that birth mothers are often "poor, illiterate, and young").
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interests of the child, and for that matter the mother and father, are most likely to be subordinated by greed or ulterior motives."
136
Of course, there is not a serious question of voluntariness in every adoption case, and the existence of state law allowing prospective adoptive parents to cover birth-parent expenses of any kind does not necessarily create a lack of consent. But the risk of the coercive effects of payments is high, and it necessarily affects poor women disproportionately, as they are most likely to consider relinquishing their children for adoption and are most likely to need and be influenced by cash payments. 137 That class effect, in and of itself, should give us pause. Professor Radin argues that the sale of "personal things" by those in poverty should necessarily be presumed to result from a lack of free choice. 138 And "to protect the integrity of the adoption proceedings and to safeguard the best interests of the child," 139 every possible step should be taken to ensure birth-mother voluntariness.
C. The Discouragement of Quality Adoptive Parents
One of the most controversial issues surrounding adoption, particularly in the last twenty years, is the growing trend of American parents seeking to adopt internationally rather than pursuing domestic adoption in the United States. 140 The problem, as many see it, is that this decision to go abroad to build a family necessarily means, at least for each child adopted internationally by American parents, a child in need in the United States is left without an adoptive home. 141 This view is supported by recent statistics. In the year 2002 alone, approximately 21,378 children from abroad were adopted into American families, an increase of 15,719 from 1999. 142 During a similar period, however, domestic infant adoptions declined significantly, with experts estimating that in 2002, approximately 1246 fewer babies were adopted by American families than in 1996. 143 Many often complicated reasons may KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 explain why prospective adoptive parents have increasingly chosen a global route when it comes to adoption. 144 One of those reasons is the financial drain, and worse, financial uncertainty surrounding domestic infant adoption. 145 There is a strong economic incentive to go international. And because expenses paid to birth parents are almost always one of the most substantial items of cost in a domestic adoption, 146 reevaluation of the propriety of these payments at a time of rather widespread dissatisfaction with the domestic adoption system seems long overdue.
Far and away the most significant downside of the infant-domesticadoption scheme in this country, at least from the prospective-adoptiveparent perspective, is that the transaction has no guarantee of completion, even once the prospective parents expend large sums of money.
147
Domestic infant adoption these days often costs as much as $40,000. 148 And while the total cost of an international adoption typically comes in at a pricier $50,000, 149 largely because of travel costs, 150 it is still viewed in adoption circles as a more stable financial bet. 151 In the international adoption arena, with very few exceptions, those who enter the process, pay the requisite fees, and are found to be suitable adoptive parents succeed in bringing a child into their families. International adoptions begun are said to complete roughly eighty-six percent of the time. 152 There are never any guarantees surrounding the availability of a particular child for whom prospective adoptive parents begin the adoption process. But even if that particular child is determined to be unavailable for adoption, another adoptable child is typically identified, 153 and prospective adoptive parents generally pay a previously agreed-upon agency fee for a near certainty that they will return with a new member of the family.
154
Domestic adoption, meanwhile, is fraught with uncertainty.
155 And while the cost may appear lower, 156 that apparent financial incentive to adopt domestically is almost entirely neutralized by evidence of final placement rates.
157
Because adoption agencies are not compelled to report and no government agency compiles statistics on failed adoptions, there is no perfect data detailing domestic adoption failure rates.
158
Nonetheless, industry experts estimate that as many as half of the matches made between birth and prospective adoptive families fail.
159
Birth mothers who create adoption plans with prospective adoptive families or adoption agencies later decide to parent their children themselves nearly eighty percent of the time. 160 And lest one assume that the ultimate fulfillment of a birth mother's adoption plan is completely unrelated to the payment of her living expenses, "[l]ong and often bitter experience has repeatedly demonstrated that the birth mother who is most financially demanding is also the birth mother who is most likely to fail to complete the adoption plan." 161 for prospective adoptive parents that the country from which they choose to adopt will close for foreign adoptions after their adoption process has begun. That risk can be substantially minimized, however, if prospective adoptive parents select a long-running program with current political support in the country of origin. 158. Indeed, adoption agencies have no incentive to disclose statistics regarding failed adoptions to prospective adoptive parents or the public in general, as widespread knowledge of the information would likely make the agency's services appear less attractive.
159. See Scherreik, supra note 7, at 134E4 ("Experts estimate that 25% to 50% of potential placements fall through."); see also Gearino, supra note 7 (citing a survey of readers of Adoptive Families magazine finding that twenty-nine percent of readers polled had a domestic adoption fail at some point before one succeeded).
160. See Mansnerus, supra note 19, at A1; see also Steven Pressman, The Baby Brokers, CAL. LAW., July 1991 , at 30, 34, 105. 161. Donnelly, supra note 56, § 6:20. See generally People ex rel. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 195 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1959 ) (explaining that the birth mother refused to carry out the adoption plan after receiving funds from the adoptive parents for months prior to the birth). KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 A birth parent's change of heart is doubtless an emotionally devastating event for prospective adoptive parents. Unfortunately, it may be financially devastating as well. The vast majority of expenses paid by prospective adoptive parents in connection with a domestic adoption-particularly birth-mother living expenses-are paid before the birth of the child.
162 But a birth mother may not execute a surrender of parental rights or consent to an adoption until some period of time after the child is born. 163 Thus, in almost all cases, when a birth mother changes her mind and decides to parent the child herself, the prospective adoptive parents, who now find themselves without the child they had hoped to parent, have already paid living expenses. 164 Still worse, distraught adoptive parents almost always have no means of recovering the expenses they paid from either the adoption agency involved or the birth mother who has decided to parent. 165 The financial risk of domestic adoption is simply too great for many qualified prospective adoptive families to bear, and, thus, they turn away from domestic adoption and toward other countries to build their families.
Perhaps an even graver concern than the potential loss of adoptive parents to intercountry adoption, however, is the very real possibility that the cost of domestic adoption may lead to the loss of many quality adoptive families altogether. In essence, the high cost of infant adoption The bulk of the financial uncertainty surrounding living-expense payments made in connection with domestic adoption flows from the notion that they are paid in advance of the birth and generally not returned to the prospective adoptive parents under any circumstances. State law supports the payment of birth-mother living expenses and provides prospective adoptive parents no means of recovering the monies they pay regardless of whether the birth mother ultimately places her child for adoption.
If a birth mother perpetrates a fraud on a prospective adoptive family to reap financial reward-never intending to go through with the placement agreement she perfected or otherwise misrepresenting her status or intentions in a way that is designed to unjustly enrich her to the prospective adoptive parents' detriment-state laws permit the prospective adoptive parents to file suit against the birth mother for fraud.
167
Where this cause of action can be proven, the defrauded prospective adoptive parents may recover damages for the loss they sustained, possibly including all sums paid to and on behalf of the birth mother and other damages, including those for emotional distress. 166. See Klinke, supra note 26, at 148 (arguing that if the surrogate mother fee is too high, some caring couples will not be able to afford it).
167. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(c) (West 2008) (creating a misdemeanor for any parent who obtains financial benefit with the intent to either not complete the adoption or not consent to the adoption); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4.1(d-1) (West 2010) (allowing reimbursement where natural parent either knew that she was not pregnant or accepted payments from more than one adoptive family); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9.5 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010 ) (stating that birth mother commits "adoption deception" if she knowingly or intentionally benefits from expenses "when [she] knows or should have known that [she] is not pregnant," when the first adoptive parent is not aware that "another prospective adoptive parent is also paying adoption related expenses . . . in an effort to adopt the same child," or when the mother does not intend to make an adoptive placement); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(2) (West 2008) ("It is unlawful for any person to receive payment for medical and other necessary expenses related to the birth of a child from a prospective adoptive parent with the intent of not consenting to or completing the adoption of the child."); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-03(d) (West 2000) ("A prospective adoptive parent may seek to recover a payment if the parent or other person receives or accepts it with the fraudulent intent to prevent the proposed adoption from being completed.").
168. In one particularly well-publicized case, Maya-Anne Mays worked with an adoption agency to be matched with prospective adoptive parents who might provide a loving home for the child she claimed to be carrying-a child whose father she said was a soldier killed in Iraq. 169 Ms. Mays took money from three couples who desired to adopt her baby-$250 from one couple for unspecified expenses, $1050 from another couple for rent, and nearly $12,000 for two months from a third couple.
170 None of those families succeeded in adopting Mays's baby. In fact, it is unclear whether she ever had a baby at all. Mays's attorney contended at trial that she delivered a baby stillborn and dropped it outside an Oregon hospital.
171 Oregon officials did not believe her story; they prosecuted Mays for hatching a scheme to defraud area couples by faking pregnancy to induce payments of substantial living expenses.
172
After Mays's lawyer failed to present any evidence substantiating her pregnancy at trial, 173 Mays was convicted and sentenced to a three-year prison term.
174 Whether the couples who provided Mays with monies for living expenses ever recovered the funds of which they were deprived is unclear, but each of these couples could likely have pursued a civil suit against Mays.
175
Cases like that involving Maya-Anne Mays 176 are certainly troubling, but, in the end, prospective adoptive parents are wellprotected by state laws on fraud.
177
The real difficulty in this area is in establishing fraud in connection with the adoption plan a birth mother makes for her child. REV. 709, 709 (1987) such a claim requires proof of fraudulent intent. 179 And while that intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence, 180 it is rather difficult to come by. Unless the alleged birth mother is not pregnant at all when she develops an adoption plan and accepts payments of living and other expenses from prospective adoptive parents, she is likely to have second thoughts and, in fact, to vacillate frequently in her decision-making regarding her unborn child.
181 Indeed, most mental health professionals agree that while a birth mother may perfect an adoption plan and fully intend to stick with it and place her child as the plan describes, the decision must be made all over again once the child is born. 182 Under the circumstances that necessarily surround domestic adoptions, then, one would expect to see evidence of vacillation, doubt, and uncertainty surrounding a birth parent's decision to relinquish a child for adoption. As a result, any circumstantial evidence of fraud should be viewed skeptically, and proof of fraudulent intent ought to be more strongly demonstrated in the adoption context than it must be in the typical fraud case. Proof issues aside, most pregnant women perfecting an adoption plan are not acting with intent to defraud prospective adoptive parents in making the plan; they simply want the best for their babies and believe they are moving toward a positive future both for themselves and the children to whom they will give birth.
183 That these women may later change their minds and choose to parent does not mean they ever possessed a fraudulent intent. In short, only in the very rare domestic adoption case is fraud committed. Cases like that involving Maya-Anne Mays do arise, but, thankfully, they occur rather infrequently.
In the garden-variety domestic-adoption failure, then, there is no fraud, but simply a change of heart. And in these cases, would-be adoptive parents almost always find themselves with no child and no (describing the difficulties faced by adoptive parents in recovering when birth parents act fraudulently).
179. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 23 (2001 (2009) (noting that early decisions to make an adoption plan are often made, but until the point of delivery, there is typically no real emotional commitment to those decisions); see also HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 83, § 2.11 [1] [a] (stating that "the hormonal and other physiological changes that occur . . . may render the biological mother unusually susceptible to external pressures to retain her child").
183. See Ayres, supra note 182, at 279-80 (discussing difficulty of the birth parent's decision to relinquish); Hearings, supra note 3, at 17 (testimony of William Acosta, Deputy Comm'r, Div. of Servs., N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Servs.) (testifying that birth mothers are often told that if they change their minds and choose to parent, they will be depriving "the child of a lifestyle that [they] could not hope to provide"). KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 means of recouping the often substantial sums of money they have already expended, particularly when it comes to housing payments made on behalf of the birth mother during pregnancy. Adoption agencies are generally well-insulated from the claims of disappointed prospective adoptive parents, 184 largely because agency-drafted contracts expressly state that all fees paid to the agency in connection with an adoption are nonrefundable under any and all circumstances. 185 Moreover, many expenses paid by prospective adoptive parents are paid directly to thirdparty service providers. 186 Housing may well be one such expense. 187 In fact, it may be more logical in some cases for prospective adoptive parents to arrange to make, for instance, rental payments on behalf of a birth mother directly to the landlord, to ensure that only actual expenses are covered. In these cases, the agency has no role in the payment of sums directly from the prospective adoptive parents to a third-party housing provider, and the agency cannot be called upon to refund living expenses paid if the adoption fails. 188 Likewise, the third-party housing provider owes no duty to prospective adoptive parents with whom he has no contractual relationship; he has provided the service for which he was paid.
189
If anyone owes a duty of reimbursement to prospective adoptive parents, it is the birth mother who received cost-free housing and chose not to complete her adoption plan. The decision regarding the fate of the child is the birth mother's to make, 190 and almost no one would argue that she lacks the right to make whatever final decision she wishes. 191 But if the birth mother chooses to parent the child, she has essentially received a huge financial benefit from prospective adoptive parents to 2011] REREGULATING THE BABY MARKET 321 whom she provided nothing but heartache in return. 192 From a purely equitable standpoint, the end result of such a failed adoption should be to put the parties back into their original positions. 193 This would require a birth mother who received housing payments under an adoption plan she did not fulfill to reimburse prospective adoptive parents in the amount of the benefit she received. Assuming no fraud exists, as is true in the vast majority of cases, a state law cause of action such as unjust enrichment could be used to pursue this recovery, and it may fit the bill quite well. 194 The problem, simply stated, is that courts almost never charge a birth parent in a failed adoption with the duty to repay monies received from prospective adoptive parents who desired to adopt the child. 195 Even for the lucky couple for whom a planned domestic adoption succeeds-with the birth parents executing surrenders in accordance with the adoption plan-prospective adoptive parents have a limited practical ability to have living expenses they paid in connection with the adoption reviewed in any meaningful way for reasonableness, necessity, or any other limiting standard. Most states do require prospective adoptive parents to disclose all fees paid in connection with an adoption when they petition the court for finalization of the adoption. 196 And some state courts have ordered intermediary agencies to reimburse prospective adoptive parents for fees paid which were in excess of the state KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 standard. 197 But those cases are exceptionally rare. Courts almost never order expense reimbursement in a successful adoption at the finalization stage. 198 The focus of the proceeding at that point simply rests elsewhere. Moreover, as previously discussed, many states find such reimbursement orders a violation of public policy. 199 And, of course, birth mothers placing their children for adoption are typically poor women against whom any judgment is likely virtually uncollectible. 200 As a result, whether they are successful in adopting the children delivered by the birth mothers with whom they are matched or not, prospective adoptive parents are highly unlikely to see the return of any monies they expend for birth-parent living expenses. And if their first attempt at adoption results in failure, which is statistically quite likely, many prospective adoptive parents do not have the financial means to start the adoption process anew after losing tens of thousands of dollars. In the current legal landscape, a failed adoption will likely mark the end of a prospective adoptive parent's journey.
A Skewed Pool of Prospective Adoptive Parents Along Lines of Wealth
That domestic adoption is too expensive is a relatively noncontroversial assertion. Considering the hundreds of thousands of children available for adoption each year, serious attempts need to be made to balance the free-market approach under which only the wealthiest of couples will become parents through domestic adoption. Reducing the expense for families pursuing domestic adoption would better serve the needs of our children.
Living expenses of the birth parents are only one of the many expenses that arise in connection with domestic adoption. 201 If any real effort were made to reform American adoption procedure to make it more palatable from a cost perspective, agency and attorney brokerage fees, as significant costs of a domestic adoption, 202 would need to be reviewed as well. Nonetheless, birth-parent living expenses often make up a large portion of a domestic adoption budget. 203 The permissibility of these payments contributes to the small size of the pool of prospective adoptive parents who can afford domestic adoption.
Some may argue that prospective adoptive parents who are unable to afford birth-mother living expenses are too poor to adopt anyway, and thus, perhaps it is in the best interest of children that such parents are priced out of the adoption market. 204 This argument fails to consider, however, that the average income of a family in this country is around $61,000.
205
Reasonable birth-mother living expenses of $1500 per month for a period of six months, or a total of $9000, represents nearly fifteen percent of a typical family's annual income and may be very difficult for prospective adoptive parents to front at the start of an adoption. Such difficulties do not mean that these same prospective adoptive parents would be unable to adequately raise the child they KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
adopt. The cost of raising a child is borne slowly over time, 206 and there are cost efficiencies and economies of scale inherent in adding to an existing family that do not exist when it comes to advancing a nonhousehold-member's expenses for many months. 207 Moreover, "[m]any homes with scarce financial resources are nevertheless adequate to provide the love, protection and support that children require."
208
With the American foster-care system in crisis, 209 one must also consider whether it is a positive development that some families wishing to adopt cannot afford to build families through domestic infant adoption; the hope is that such families will turn to the foster-care system and adopt from there at little or no cost.
210 Unfortunately, the current foster-care system is not an attractive alternative for many prospective adoptive parents, regardless of their financial inability to pursue a private or agency adoption. The rather scant possibility that a fostered child will have a case plan orientated toward eventual adoption, 211 the likelihood that the child will suffer long-term effects of abuse and neglect, 212 and the relative infrequency with which very young children are available for adoption 213 makes the fost-adopt system an unacceptable alternative for many families.
In short, the risk of allowing birth-parent living expenses to be paid in connection with a domestic infant adoption means that birth parents are likely to select adoptive parents who can pay these expenses over those who cannot. Indeed, substantial evidence exists to demonstrate that birth mothers regularly engage in just this type of selective behavior-when they live in states that do not allow prospective adoptive parents to pay birth-mother housing benefits, they flock to states more friendly in allowing these payments to give birth and place their children. 214 Thus, state law sanctioning payment of living expenses may discourage all but the wealthiest of families from pursuing the domestic adoption of an infant, thereby diminishing the pool of prospective adoptive parents and inhibiting the ability of loving and capable families to be candidates as adoptive parents through domestic adoption. And while "financial considerations are certainly a factor, placement of children in adoptive homes should not rest solely on the wealth of the adoptors."
215 Such a result is clearly not in the best interest of the 22,000 or so children relinquished in infant domestic adoptions each year. 216 
D. The Misplacement of the Support Burden
One of the most troubling features of state law allowing the prospective adoptive parents of a child to pay birth-mother living expenses is that these rules place the burden of caring for a birth mother in necessitous circumstances on the shoulders of a party who, from a logical standpoint, should not bear it. One scholar has warned, for instance, that if adoptive parents are not legally free to provide birth mothers with reasonable financial support during pregnancy, the likely result will be an "epidemic of teen-age mothers necessarily on welfare." 217 Aside from the fact that there is no reason to believe the prediction has any merit, 218 shouldn't the government bear more of the KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 responsibility for taking care of its citizens than should a prospective adoptive parent who hopes for, but has no guarantee whatsoever of, the chance to parent a birth mother's child? The question of the propriety of the existence of social welfare programs in general is highly controversial, but as long as such programs exist and their purpose is to protect the interests of the nation and state's most needy citizens, birth mothers and their unborn fetuses seem to fall squarely within the domain of those eligible for government assistance. In short, states have an interest in protecting their birth-mother citizens. Prospective adoptive parents have no such duty. But the very existence of state laws that allow prospective adoptive parents to legally cover birth-mother living expenses means that, for all practical purposes, it is adoptive parents who bear the burden of birth-mother care that the state or federal government would likely otherwise bear.
219
In the Medicaid context, an evaluation of the proper placement of the burden of caring for needy birth mothers and their fetuses has been made. When pregnant women considering adoption for their unborn children live in poverty, their medical expenses in connection with the pregnancy are typically covered by Medicaid. 220 In the case of In re Adoption of Baby Boy M., at finalization of the adoption proceeding, the Kansas trial court ordered the adoptive parents to reimburse Medicaid for expenses covered by that program for the birth mother's medical expenses in delivering the child. 221 The appellate court reversed, holding that no law required the adoptive parents to make this reimbursement, and in the absence of any such provision, the adoptive parents held no such duty.
222
Michigan allocates responsibility for a birth mother's medical expenses even more clearly; prospective adoptive parents are only permitted to pay medical expenses incurred by the birth mother in liberal rules allow for the greatest payments of birth-mother living expenses, is higher than that in Colorado, a state which prohibits the payment of birth-mother living expenses altogether. See State Per Capita Welfare Caseloads, STATEMASTER.COM, http://www.statemaster.com/graph/eco_wel_ cas_tot_fam_percap-caseloads-total-families-per-capita (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
219. The placement of the support burden on prospective adoptive parents, typically strangers to the birth mother and not predisposed to bestow upon her any gratuity, leads to the nearly inescapable conclusion that the payments made are really made for the child itself.
220. States that elect to cover the medically needy under their Medicaid plans are required to cover children under age eighteen and pregnant women under federal guidelines. connection with an adoption if those expenses are not covered by Medicaid.
223
In essence, even in a successful adoption, states generally place the burden of caring for the medical needs of the birth mother during pregnancy on the government, rather than on adoptive parents. To do otherwise in the context of living expenses-where the possibilities may include government assistance with housing through a program of social welfare or private coverage of birth mother living expenses by prospective adoptive parents-is inconsistent with the rules governing Medicaid and difficult to justify.
When the birth mother is married at the time of the adoptive placement-which is not all that rare-even more significant questions arise concerning the placement of the burden of paying her living expenses on the prospective adoptive parents' shoulders. The only rational reason for allowing the birth mother to receive monies on which to live from the prospective adoptive parents-and to allow her to, at the same time, avoid a serious charge of baby selling-is that these monies pay for the birth mother to live during a period for which she is unable to work, typically only a lengthy period if there are complications in the pregnancy. The pregnancy of the birth mother should not interfere with her husband's ability to work, however. And in every state, spouses have a duty to support each other financially during marriage, a duty which is taken quite seriously and enforced with some regularity even while marriages are ongoing. 224 Thus, a married birth mother is already owed a primary duty of support by her husband. Allowing prospective adoptive parents to pay her living expenses without caveat shifts the primary obligation for the birth mother's support from her spouse to typically unrelated adoptive parents. Essentially, they allow the husband of a birth mother to profit from the adoptive parents while simultaneously abdicating his own responsibility for her support. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
IV. PROHIBITION: THE ONLY ADOPTION-SAVING ALTERNATIVE
Domestic adoption is facing a serious crisis. The success rate of planned placements is abysmal. Adoptive parents are defecting to intercountry adoption in masses. And the requirement that prospective adoptive parents pay exorbitant fees to adopt makes domestic adoption impossible for many couples. Indeed, the President of the National Council for Adoption, an agency advocacy group, recently remarked that "you don't need a lesson in economics" to understand that the adoption marketplace has created perverse consequences, particularly related to race.
225 Indeed, something akin to a price schedule has emerged for white babies, distinct from that applicable to racial minorities.
226
The American system of private and agency adoption needs to be reformed dramatically. A modest, yet transformative place to start in reregulating the baby market 227 is with a ban on prospective adoptive parents' payment of birth-family living expenses.
Time has demonstrated that less conservative reform will be ineffective at solving the problems plaguing domestic adoption. Reasonableness and necessity limitations have not succeeded, nor have small dollar caps on living expenses. "Because less than [two] percent of unmarried pregnant women are placing their babies for adoption, they now have 'the option to be very, very selective.'" 228 Indeed, they have profited-not merely subsisted-from the existing domestic adoption landscape. Banning the payment of living expenses in connection with adoption would send a strong message distinguishing adoption from baby selling 229 and increase the likelihood that more prospective adoptive parents would foray into domestic adoption, serving not only those adoptive parents but also children in need of homes. 1925, 1967-73 (2009) (describing the expressive function of rules in the family-law arena).
230. There is a risk that eliminating the living-expense windfall would lead more pregnant women to select abortion. See STEPHEN COLEMAN, THE ETHICS OF ARTIFICIAL UTERUSES: IMPLICATIONS FOR REPRODUCTION AND ABORTION 74 (2004) (describing sociological influences on the decision between adoption and abortion). This risk may be quite real, but it is unquantifiable. And fear of it is no longer a sufficient reason to continue a system demonstrated over time to be seriously flawed.
